Remembering Paul Alexander: Overcoming Adversity, Inspiring Generations

"Supreme Court Expresses Doubt Regarding the Use of Obstruction Law in Charging Jan. 6 Rioters"

"The justices' inquiries pondered the seriousness of the assault and whether prosecutors have been stretching legal boundaries to target individuals within the mob accountable for the attack."

"On Tuesday, the Supreme Court appeared cautious about permitting prosecutors to utilize a federal obstruction law to prosecute the numerous rioters involved in the Capitol attack on January 6, 2021."

A ruling that opposes the government's understanding of the law could not only disrupt those prosecutions but also dismiss two of the federal charges against former President Donald J. Trump in the case alleging his involvement in plotting to undermine the 2020 election.

During the argument, Mr. Trump's case wasn't discussed, with the focus primarily on deciphering a statute acknowledged by all parties as lacking clarity. However, the justices' inquiries also delved into the seriousness of the assault and whether prosecutors were extending the boundaries of the law to implicate individuals within the mob accountable for the attack.

Justice Clarence Thomas, back on the bench following an unexplained absence on Monday, inquired whether the government was engaging in selective prosecution. "There have been numerous violent protests disrupting proceedings," he noted. "Has the government invoked this provision in other protest cases?"

Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Neil M. Gorsuch raised similar questions during the proceedings.

However, the justices primarily deliberated on whether a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted after the Enron scandal, applies to the actions of former police officer Joseph W. Fischer, who took part in the Capitol assault on January 6, 2021.

The law is central to two of the federal charges against Mr. Trump in his election subversion case, and over 350 individuals involved in storming the Capitol have faced prosecution under it. If the Supreme Court aligns with Mr. Fischer and determines that the statute doesn't encompass his alleged actions, Mr. Trump is likely to argue that it similarly doesn't apply to his behavior.

Enacted in 2002, this law was prompted by accounting fraud and document destruction, with the provision written broadly.

The law aimed to address a deficiency in the federal criminal code: while it was illegal to induce others to destroy records relevant to an investigation or official proceeding, there was no provision for doing so oneself. The legislation sought to rectify this omission.

The law accomplished this through a two-part provision. The first part criminalizes the corrupt alteration, destruction, or concealment of evidence with the intent to obstruct official proceedings. The second part, which is relevant in Mr. Fischer's case, criminalizes any corrupt obstruction, influence, or impediment of official proceedings through other means.

The crux of the case lies in the transition from the first part to the second. Prosecutors argue that the ordinary interpretation of "otherwise" implies "in a different manner." Therefore, they contend that obstruction of official proceedings doesn't necessarily require evidence destruction. They argue that the second part serves as a broad catchall, encompassing various types of conduct.

 

Mr. Fischer's legal team argues that the first part of the provision should shape and constrain the second part, focusing on obstruction associated with evidence destruction. In their interpretation, they would consider "otherwise" to mean "in a similar manner."

This case is among several on the court's docket that relate to or involve Mr. Trump. In another case scheduled for argument next week, the justices will assess Mr. Trump's assertion of total immunity from prosecution.

Mr. Fischer stands accused of entering the Capitol at approximately 3:24 p.m. on January 6, 2021, at a time when the counting of electoral ballots had been halted following the initial assault.

According to prosecutors, he had reportedly informed a superior via text message that "it might get violent." Additionally, in another message, he suggested that "they should storm the Capitol and drag all the Democrats into the street for a mob trial."

According to prosecutors, videos depicted Mr. Fischer shouting "Charge!" before pushing through the crowd, directing vulgar language at police officers, and colliding with a line of them.

Mr. Fischer's legal team contests some of these allegations. However, the inquiry before the justices pertains to a legal matter rather than factual disputes: Does the 2002 law encompass the actions Mr. Fischer is accused of?

Part of resolving this issue may hinge on interpreting another term in the law: the requirement that the defendant acted "corruptly." There is disagreement over the meaning of this word.

In fact, the judges in the majority of an appeals court ruling against Mr. Fischer couldn't reach a consensus on the precise definition of the word.

In the primary opinion, Judge Florence Y. Pan stated that Mr. Fischer's actions met any reasonable interpretation of the term, and she declined to select one over the others.

However, Judge Justin R. Walker stated that he would agree with her opinion only if prosecutors were mandated to demonstrate that Mr. Fischer had acted corruptly with the intent to secure an unlawful advantage, either for himself or for someone else.

Judge Walker emphasized the importance of this definition, stating that it restricted what would otherwise be an exceedingly broad application of the law. He expressed, "If I did not interpret 'corruptly' narrowly, I would align with the dissenting opinion."

In his dissent, Judge Gregory G. Katsas articulated that he would define "corruptly" even more restrictively, necessitating an intent to obtain "an unlawful financial, professional, or exculpatory advantage."

"In contrast, Judge Katsas wrote, this case pertains to the considerably more diffuse and intangible benefit of ensuring a preferred candidate remains in the presidency."

Judge Walker expressed skepticism about that interpretation, but he acknowledged that Mr. Fischer's actions might still meet even that stringent criterion.

In the 2015 case Yates v. United States, which involved the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Supreme Court determined that undersized red grouper did not qualify as "tangible objects" under a separate provision, also designed to address evidence destruction.

The alternate provision renders it illegal to hide or destroy "any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence" a federal investigation. In a specific case, a fisherman received a 30-day sentence for tossing the fish overboard upon their discovery by an official.

During the appeal, the fisherman contended that the term "tangible object," within the framework of a law targeting white-collar fraud, did not encompass fish. The Supreme Court concurred with this interpretation in a 5-to-4 decision.

"A fish is undoubtedly a tangible object," wrote Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for four of the justices in the majority. However, she emphasized that interpreting the law to include all objects, regardless of their size or significance, would detach it "from its financial-fraud foundation."

In her dissent, Justice Elena Kagan emphasized that the literal words of the law held greater significance than its intended purpose.

"A fish is certainly a distinct entity with tangible physical attributes," Justice Kagan wrote, referencing the Dr. Seuss classic "One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish" as support for her argument.